Facebook abuse injury claim seeks novel “carriage service” damages

A retired NSW solicitor who chose to commence proceedings in the Federal Court for injury compensation over vile and abusive Facebook messages has paved the way for an additional legal remedy to deploy against the scourge of cyberbullying.

Robert Mulley received the first abusive message from Warren Hayes in January 2020.  The second message a month later – to his wife – labelled him a “paedophile” and his wife a “slut”.

Both messages threatened violence to the recipients.

Mulley issued proceedings seeking damages for loss of consortium and for psychological injuries caused by the violent and offensive content the sending of which was unlawful by operation s 474.17 of the Criminal Code Act (Cth) which prohibits use of a “carriage service” to menace, harass or cause offence.

He also claimed damages for the defamatory imputations in the second message received by his wife.

It was not in dispute that Facebook Messenger is a “carriage service” because it carries “communications by means of guided and/or unguided electromagnetic energy”.

The claim came before Justice Michael Lee who noted that it was not at first glance one whose subject matter of itself brought it within the court’s jurisdiction.

His Honour noted however – in relation to the carriage service claim – that the question remained open as to whether “the law of Australia recognises tortious liability for harm caused by unlawful acts directed against an applicant”.

He concluded Mulley’s claim – although “novel” – was arguable as “a common law action on the case”.

In a hearing on the separate issue of “whether the jurisdiction of the court had been properly invoked” he considered whether such a common law claim in reliance on a federal statute meant the Federal Court had “subject-matter jurisdiction to quell the dispute”.

That answer depended in turn on whether “the rights, duties, or subject matter with which the controversy is concerned have their origin in or owe their existence to a law of the Commonwealth”.

Those questions were – in relation to the carriage service claim – both answered in the affirmative.

And even if that claim were to fail, there was “sufficient commonality” concerning the underlying facts and allegations in relation to the defamation action, to allow it to proceed in the Federal Court regardless.

On the other hand, the court would have had no jurisdiction to deal with a pure defamation claim, ie one that was unaccompanied by the separate claim relying on the breach of the federal carriage service law.

A final determination on the matter is likely to occur in early 2022.

Mulley v Hayes [2021] FCA 1111 Lee J, 13 September 2021

In further developments in the law of defamation, the High Court found media organisations who posted content relating to news stories on their public Facebook pages, they were liable for the publication of defamatory “comments” posted by third-party Facebook users in response to the content.

By a 5:2 majority, the court held that – by facilitating and encouraging the third-party comment – the media organisations “participated” in the communication of the defamatory material and were thereby publishers of it.

Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd V Dylan Voller; Nationwide News Pty Limited V Dylan Voller; Australian News Channel Pty Ltd V Dylan Voller [2021] HCA 27 Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane, Gordon, Edelman, Steward, Gleeson JJ, 8 September 2021

source https://cartercapner.com.au/blog/facebook-abuse-injury-claim-seeks-novel-carriage-service-damages/

Jurisdiction error proved fatal for father’s aircraft crash nervous shock claim

The father of an 11-yr-old girl killed when her light aircraft crashed minutes after take-off from an idyllic Hawkesbury River waterway, has lost what is likely to have been his last chance to win damages over the psychological injury sustained in coping with the aftermath of the calamity.

Heather Page – together with her mother, stepfather, two stepbrothers and the pilot – died when the six-seater de Havilland Beaver floatplane met disaster on New Year’s Eve in 2017 on return to the Sydney Seaplanes base in Rose Bay.

The Australian Transportation Safety Bureau ultimately concluded that the pilot had been overcome by carbon monoxide from exhaust gas entering the cabin through holes in the main firewall where bolts were missing and in gaps around other bolts that were worn or were “non-specific”.

Ingestion of the fumes during the 27-minute taxi to the pickup location at Cottage Point left the pilot vulnerable to the onset of confusion, visual disturbances and disorientation when the engine and exhaust gases were at maximum output during and after take-off.

Alex Page filed his claim for compensation for “nervous shock” against Sydney Seaplanes as carrier in the Federal Court pursuant to – and prior to the two-year deadline specified in – the Civil Aviation (Carrier’s Liability) Act (Cth).

That was the fundamental legal error from which – despite valiant attempts – he was unable to recover, dooming any chance of a successful compensation outcome.

Regrettably, that Act had no application as it applies only to interstate and overseas commercial passenger transport.

The error was not one that could be rectified by simply amending the claim to refer to the NSW Act applying identical liability provisions to intra-state commercial air operations.

Page’s claim was thus struck out by Justice John Griffiths in April 2020 who ruled that no amount of amendment could remediate the plaintiff’s position because the Federal Court had no jurisdiction to determine a matter devoid of any element of federal legislation or intercourse between states.

Because the two-year limitation period had already expired, it was too late to file fresh proceedings.

Page’s lawyers devised a “work around” by applying to the NSW Supreme Court to have the Federal Court matter transferred across contending that the Federal Courts (State Jurisdiction) Act (NSW) applied to the FCA order striking out Mr Page’s “state matter” claim for “want of jurisdiction”.

Justice Christine Adamson agreed and made an order that the FCA proceeding be treated as a Supreme Court matter that had commenced on the day it was filed in the Federal Court, ie within the two year deadline.

Sydney Seaplanes or rather its insurers, appealed.

Overruling the literal interpretation applied by the primary judge, the appeal judges came to the “unavoidable conclusion”, the State Jurisdiction Act was intended only to apply to matters in which “want of jurisdiction” arose from a “constitutionally invalid conferral of jurisdiction” on the FCA.

It was after all, an urgent stop gap measure implemented by every state to remediate the effect of a High Court ruling that invalidated their respective Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Acts.

It was never intended – noted Justice Mark Leeming – to be a “safety net for litigants who misguidedly take the serious step of commencing proceedings in the Federal Court without first considering the issue of jurisdiction”.

So while the literal meaning of the State Jurisdiction Act allowed Mr Page’s claim to be revived in the Supreme Court, that meaning was rejected because it was inconsistent with its statutory purpose.

“The literal meaning of words in a statute will not always, correspond to their legal meaning,” observed the Appeal Court President, Justice Andrew Bell.

Barring a further appeal to the High Court of Australia, that is the end of the road for Mr Page’s claim against the carrier.

Sydney Seaplanes Pty Ltd v Page [2021] NSWCA 204 Bell P Leeming JA Emmett AJA, 7 September 2021 Read case

source https://cartercapner.com.au/blog/jurisdiction-error-proved-fatal-for-fathers-aircraft-crash-nervous-shock-claim/

Senior employee wins psych damages claim for reasonable management action taken unreasonably

An employee of a regional council centered on Moranbah in the Bowen Basin has won a ruling that the management action that caused an adjustment disorder as a result of a disciplinary proceeding that was reasonable management action taken unreasonably.

Trevor Maher joined the Isaac Regional Council as a Regulatory Services Program Leader in March 2016.

In May 2018 and number of concerns arose in relation to his conduct.

A meeting to discuss the suspension was convened by two management representatives “very close to knock off time” without any notice to Maher of its purpose and without affording him any opportunity to prepare any response to the allegations. Neither was he given, the opportunity to bring in a support person until – on the council’s version of events – the meeting was underway and before its purpose was revealed.

Regardless, he was suspended on pay while an “external investigation” was carried out.

Some of the allegations were – in a draft report from the Council’s consultants, Livingstones – found to have been substantiated, as a result of which he was issued a Show Cause Notice in August 2018 concerning breaches of the Council’s Code of Conduct.

His employment was terminated as a result of the findings in May 2019.

He is recorded as suffering “an adjustment disorder with anxiety and depressed mood” as from 29 August 2018 but his application for workers’ compensation was denied by Local Government WorkCover on the grounds that any such injury resulted from “reasonable management action”.

Maher’s referral of the matter to the Regulator in August 2019 resulted in the original decision being confirmed.

He appealed that decision to the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission, contending that the absence of prior notice of the purpose of the “suspension” meeting and the giving of opportunity to call a support person into the meeting, was unreasonable.

The matter came before Commissioner McLennan before whom Maher also alleged it had been unreasonable for the Council’s Show Cause Notice not to fully particularise all allegations in the grounds on which they were made; and to have issued that Notice prior to its receipt of the final version of the external investigation report.

The Council denied these allegations and contended that if there were any instances of procedural unfairness, they amounted to a mere “blemish”.

It also assert that although Maher was summoned to his manager’s office at 4:40 PM “cold”, he must have “sniffed the wind”.

In the Commissioner’s view “it should not have been left to Mr Maher to assume what the meeting was about… rather, the onus is on the Council to tell him in advance”.

Further “the failure to offer Mr Maher the opportunity for a support person prior to the suspension interview was unreasonable”.

In relation to the Show Cause Notice, the court found that there was insufficient particularisation within the notice itself in breach of the particular disciplinary provisions of the Local Government Regulations.

Further, the Council should have required the external investigated to prioritise the delivery of the final investigation report including all attachments to enable its prompt deliberation on the matters “in their entirety”.

Having regard to the breaches concerning the Show Cause Notice and the suspension meeting, the court was compelled to conclude that the action taken in relation to Mr Maher, however reasonable, was not taken on a reasonable manner.

As a result the Council was not afforded the defence under s 32 (5) of the Workers Compensation and Rehabilitation Act in relation to “reasonable management action”.

Several of Mr Maher’s other submissions were rejected by the court. Maher will now be entitled to receive statutory time off work compensation, a lump sum payment and/or common law damages for the injury sustained.

Maher v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2021] QIRC 313 McClennan IC, 10 September 2021

source https://cartercapner.com.au/blog/senior-employee-wins-psych-damages-claim-for-reasonable-management-action-taken-unreasonably/

Oz courts to aid overseas Ruby Princess pax: class action waiver clause “unfair”

The Ruby Princess departed Sydney on 8 March 2020 for New Zealand and returned on 19 March becoming the catalyst for the worst COVID-19 outbreak in the first phase of the pandemic.

Carnival – the giant US cruise boat operator of Princess, Carnival and P&O cruises – was exonerated by the NSW Commission of Enquiry notwithstanding the ship’s crew were aware of the outbreak before they docked let loose more than 2600 infected passengers into the community.

A class action against Carnival by passengers alleges it even knew of the likelihood of a Covid outbreak before setting off for New Zealand and that that the cruise should have been cancelled for that reason. The claims are in negligence, contract and for breaches of statutory warranties under the Australian Consumer Law.

Nearly 700 of their number purchased their cruise in the US on terms specified in their ticket that a lawsuit can only be filed against Carnival in California and that those passengers must not join any class action.

Carnival petitioned the Federal Court in Sydney to stay the claims of all US passengers in the class action so they could be heard in the US with US law could be applied.

At the outset Justice Angus Stewart decided in relation to Patrick Ho – the court appointed representative of all US pax – that the exclusive jurisdiction and class action waiver clauses were not incorporated into his cruise contract because they were contained in a document issued by the cruise line after the contract of carriage had in fact already been formed.

His Honour noted that each passenger’s circumstances would have to be separately examined to determine whether the same conclusion could be drawn in their cases.

He went on to make other findings in case he had erred on the incorporation of contract terms point.

He was not prepared to hold that the exclusive US jurisdiction clause was of itself an unfair term under the Australian Consumer Law but had no hesitation in concluding that the class-action waiver Carnival wanted to enforce was invalid for that very reason.

Justice Stewart went on to decide that in those circumstances it was preferable to have the US passenger claims heard in Australia specifically because they would have the advantage of class-action representation here that would be denied to them by a California court.

It was undesirable in his view that litigation dealing with “essentially identical claims” be “fractured” by being heard in two different countries with potentially different outcomes being reached.

Carnival also argued that Sydney was a “clearly an appropriate forum”. Not so, said the judge because the claims “have a substantial connection with NSW” with breaches, conduct and omissions having occurred in Sydney.

Further, because the Australian Consumer Law applied in many respects to the claims, it was very appropriate that the proceedings – even for overseas passengers – be conducted here.

The plaintiffs had argued that the court was prevented from staying  the ACL proceedings because s 138 of  the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 confers jurisdiction on the FCA in respect of all ACL matters. His Honour did not however accept the “implied prohibition” contended for.

The court reserved the issue of the law that applied to the negligence claims with Carnival asserting that they had to be determined under US maritime law.

This decision is a big win not just for for Ruby Princess passengers but for all Australian consumers as it demonstrates the effectiveness of our consumer protection law and how anti-consumer contract terms favoured by international conglomerates like Carnival will not be allowed to flourish here like they have been allowed to do in the USA.

Karpik v Carnival plc (The Ruby Princess) (Stay Application) [2021] FCA 1082 Stewart J, 10 September 2021

source https://cartercapner.com.au/blog/oz-courts-to-aid-overseas-ruby-princess-pax-class-action-waiver-clause-unfair/

Boarding school sex scandal: willing student‘s $1.5 mil award includes aggravated & exemplary damages

“It defies belief that a seemingly intelligent, mature, woman would risk her marriage and career to have a sexual relationship with a schoolboy,” wrote the judge in the case of a 13-yr-old who became infatuated with his boarding house tutor was not long out of uni with a Masters degree.

The case before the court concerned Nicholas Brockhurst who in 1996 started his first year at Toowoomba Grammar School in grade 8 and quickly established a very close relationship with his teacher.

He also saw Meredith Rawlings for evening pre-dinner tutoring sessions that often extended to 2 hours and they had daily late-night phone contact. She often came to his rugby and cricket matches where they would sit together when he was not on the field. They took a weekend bus trip together from Toowoomba to his family farm at Drillham just west of Miles.

Kissing became “more regular” from mid-1997 by which time the frequent intimacy between them had been noticed by others.

Although Rawlings was directed by the school in April 1997 not to be alone with the student “or any other schoolboy”, their closeness increased. They first had sex while he was staying – with his parent’s consent – at her home over the long weekend of the annual Downlands–Grammar rugby carnival.

It was then that his parents raised their relationship with the school after having discovered notes and faxes from Rawlings to their son. He admitted the relationship in confrontation with the school’s counsellor at the start of term 3 which led to the tutor’s departure from the school a month or so later.

Brockhurst was expelled not long after for rough and bullying behaviour towards a classmate, allegations that he denied.

He undertook year 10 at Miles State High still infatuated with his former teacher and angry at those who had bought their relationship to an end.

He returned to TGS for year 11 but fell in with “the wrong crowd who smoked weed behind the footy oval” and was expelled again. He finished years 11 and 12 at Nudgee College but his final results were “diabolical”.

The student filed a lawsuit against Rawlings more than 10 years later in 2018 claiming damages for “battery” for each instance of intimate or sexual contact on the basis that at age 13 and 14 he was not able to give consent.

He argued that after having sex for the first time his academic performance “disintegrated” and went from being a “polite and nice boy to one who challenged authority and put no effort into his schoolwork”.

Although “he did not need much persuasion” and was “over the moon” at the time, the illicit relationship had been – he pleaded – the cause of his poor schooling outcome, chequered employment history, intimacy issues and failed relationships all the while being severely depressed and suffering insomnia.

His former tutor on the other hand contended the complainant’s version was “a fantasy he convinced himself was true”.

Her version was that the boy already had an oppositional defiant disorder before his interest in her began and it was only her influence that had moderated such behaviour. She had, she swore, only embarked on the Behaviour Recovery Program – which involved extending additional attention to the boy – because of his mother’s concerns that he might self-harm.

Unfortunately her lawyers did not call any psychiatric expert evidence in that regard and those psychiatrists who gave evidence were only sparsely cross-examined.

Counsel for the defendant made much of the inconsistencies between the plaintiff’s testimony and his prior statements that – he alleged – shed doubt on his credibility.

Not so ruled Justice Soraya Ryan who heard evidence and submissions over 12 days in March and April 2021.

In her view such inconsistencies were satisfactorily explained because they related to different periods of time; reflected misunderstanding or mistake by the medical practitioner reporting what he had said; related only to peripheral matters in respect of which he had an “unsurprisingly patchy memory”; related to the context in which they were made; or were only trivial.

She also excused the student’s concealment of the relationship from psychiatrist Doug Scott whom he consulted at the behest of his parents in 1997.

“The plaintiff was a heart-broken 14-year-old boy, displaying difficult behaviours in the aftermath of the end of a relationship with a woman he adored: a relationship which he did not then understand as abusive”, she noted in exoneration of such non-dislosure.

While rejecting the plaintiff’s submission that Rawlings’ defence was entirely fabricated, Her Honour was nevertheless satisfied – rejecting Rawlings’ “innocent spin” – that the “grooming and seduction” had occurred in the “very believable progression of intimacy over time” described by the plaintiff in the witness box.

Justice Ryan reasoned in her 90-page judgement that Brockhurst’s battery claim was made out noting that she did not “need to understand why she was sexually attracted to the plaintiff or why she took the risks she did in being intimate and sexual with him”.

She upheld the claim for loss of earning capacity, concluding the psychological injury caused by the sexualised behaviour had impacted negatively on his ability to earn income.

General damages were assessed on a common law basis at $65k and past income related losses at $680k. A 30% loss of future income earning capacity was attributed to his injury, yielding a further $306k.

“Aggravated” damages – in recognition that the defendant acted with contumelious disregard for the plaintiff’s rights – of $35k, and “punitive” damages of $15k were also awarded.

The total award was $1.57 mil against which $100k – two thirds of the settlement sum already paid to the plaintiff by TGS – was deducted.

Brockhurst v Rawlings [2021] QSC 217 Ryan J 27 August 2021

source https://cartercapner.com.au/blog/boarding-school-sex-scandal-willing-students-1-5-mil-award-includes-aggravated-exemplary-damages/

Teacher in horror crash gets nod for longstanding psych injury limitation extension

He was being driven to work by his wife when they were rammed from behind and spun 180° to allow a full view of the other vehicle being torn in half and burst into flames as it hit a power pole instantly killing its driver.

Aubrey Wyatt had remained conscious throughout the October 2016 peak hour accident unlike his wife and one of his two daughters who were also passengers in the vehicle.

The family were ambulanced to the Hervey Bay hospital where Aubrey was treated for a neck injury.

WorkCover approved his workers’ compensation claim for that injury which resolved after a week whereupon he resumed teaching duties as normal.

Six months after the accident he began to experience insomnia, nightmares and flashbacks related to the horror accident.

He took leave from his position in March 2017 and applied to reopen his WorkCover claim in September 2017 through which period he consulted his GP who prescribed antidepressants and referred him for counselling and then to a psychiatrist.

In about July 2018 Aubrey commenced a RTW program.

He eventually consulted solicitors in December 2019 for advice in relation to a forthcoming Medical Assessment Tribunal hearing.

On his attempted return to full-time teaching in a classroom environment in January 2020 he realised his symptoms were so bad his “ongoing employability as a teacher” was at risk.

It was at this point Aubrey instructed solicitors to advise in relation to starting a potential motor accident injury compensation claim out of time ie more than three years after the date of accident.

A Notice of Claim was served on Suncorp as CTP insurer of the at-fault vehicle in April 2020 together with a statement that he intended to rely on s 31 of the Limitation of Actions Act to gain an extension of the limitation period by reason of material facts of a decisive nature only having come to his knowledge in the preceding three months.

The material facts relied on were the MAT assessment of a 5% permanent impairment in February 2020 and the subsequent advice from his solicitor of “the enduring nature and extent of psychological injury and the effect that might have on the extent of his loss [of future income]” on which he relied to conclude that the bringing of an injury compensation claim was justified.

His limitation extension application came before the District Court at Brisbane in February 2021 when it was resisted by Suncorp on the basis that such facts were within Aubrey’s “means of knowledge” and he would have discovered them had he made reasonable enquiries of his treating doctors at an earlier time.

He had after all received years of treatment from a psychologist and psychiatrist and taken 2 years leave from full-time employment.

In particular, psychiatrist Sharon Harding – when conducting an assessment for WorkCover in November 2018 – had diagnosed PTSD with “a very tenuous capacity to be working at all at present”.

Suncorp forcefully submitted to Chief Judge Brian Devereaux that a reasonable person in his position would have enquired at least by the end of 2018 about the potential long-term effect of the injury on his employment and would – according to the expert testimony of psychiatrist John Chalk – have been told then of his dire future employment prospects.

His Honour noted though that among the species of “material facts” relating to “the nature and extent” of the injury that may be “of a decisive character” is the fact that “the right of action has reasonable prospects of an award for damages sufficient to justify bringing the action”.

But had Wyatt taken “all reasonable steps to ascertain the seriousness of the injury” before the expiration of the limitation period?

The answer to this question “depends very much on the warning signs of the injury itself and the extent to which it or other facts might be thought to call for prudent enquiry,” Judge Devereaux observed in deciding the question in the affirmative.

“The material compels the conclusion that the applicant was struggling against serious illness but held a focus on recovery and continuing to work”.

He went on to conclude it was not until after Aubrey’s attempted resumption of full-time classroom duties and the MAT’s permanent incapacity finding, that it dawned on him his future employability was at risk.

His Honour noted that there had been no prejudice to Suncorp by the delay and that but for the operation of the limitation period, Mr Wyatt had a “meritorious claim”. He granted the extension application which will allow the claim to be determined by the Court if nor resolved by negotiation.

Wyatt v AAI Limited [2021] QDC 188 Devereaux CJDC, 16 August 2021

source https://cartercapner.com.au/blog/teacher-in-horror-crash-gets-nod-for-longstanding-psych-injury-limitation-extension/

Court says unidentified vehicle did not exist; driver to see none of $1.5 mil agreed damages

A driver whose ute collided with the rear of a preceding vehicle on a highway in Central Queensland has failed in his attempt to blame the accident on an unidentified third car with a judge concluding the story was his own invention.

Darren Medlin was driving home in December 2014 to Yeppoon from Rockhampton – on a road he knew well – thinking about the government job he had been working at for the past couple of months.

He claimed his Hilux had been following a red hatchback east until it violently swerved to the left off the road to avoid a Ford utility turning right into a driveway. He then – so his story went – slammed on the brakes and swerved but couldn’t avoid hitting the Ford.

Medlin’s version was that his view of the Ford was obscured and he wasn’t aware of it having stopped because Red Car had not slowed down behind it failed to “await its turn before proceeding” but rather swerved sharply and passed the Ford on its left at speed.

But for such unsafe driving on Red Car’s part, Medlin claims he would have seen the Ford and avoided hitting it.

Red Car did not stop at the scene and neither it nor its driver had since been identified.

Medlin and the occupants of the Ford – Hayden Finn and his mother Sharon – were seriously injured in the high speed collision.

Because he had no way of identifying Red Car’s particulars or those of its driver, Medlin’s only recourse was against the Nominal Defendant, as statutory third-party insurer for identified vehicles.

In response to the lawsuit he filed in the Supreme Court in 2017 the insurer agreed his income and other losses from the accident came to $1.5 mil but contended Medlin had made up the story about Red Car and that regardless, the driver of that vehicle did not owe him any duty in the way it went about avoiding a collision with the Ford.

The dispute came before Justice Susan Brown in Rockhampton over three days in December 2020.

While Her Honour considered Medlin to be an honest witness, “his evidence suffered from reconstruction rather than him recalling what had occurred”.

And while the evidence of other witnesses was “honest and generally reliable,” Justice Brown observed that “what witnesses saw and their recollections, are piecemeal”.

Neither Finn nor his mother recalled any car passing them just prior to the collision and none of the several witnesses called by the insurer could attest to Red Car’s presence.

The only witness called by Medlin to support his version of events remembers a red car coming out of the dust caused from the crash and driving away from the scene in a way and from a position that Her Honour thought was materially different to what Medlin had described.

An under resourced police force hadn’t investigated Red Cars presence as their priority was clearing the road and ensuring safety. Unfortunately, a number of witness statements obtained by police contained errors (included the year the crash occurred) and some were obtained months after the collision.

Justice Brown concluded that although Medlin’s version of events was “possible”, his version of events was not what in fact occurred and was not supported by any other witness.

Considering how unusual it would be for a driver violently swerve off the road as described, Her Honour found it likely that any one of the witnesses would have seen it and remembered if it did in fact happen.

Her Honour concluded Medlin had reconstructed the events and that – given his excellent driving record – Red Car offered a justification when he may well have been “lost in thought on a road he knew well, rather than focussing on what was ahead of him”.

Having arrived at that conclusion, it wasn’t necessary for the court to consider whether the driver of Red Car had in fact been negligent.

Had accurate evidence been gathered at the time of the crash, the Court may have had a clearer picture of what happened that day. That evidence may have been sufficient to persuade the Court Red Car had existed and its erratic driving had contributed to the collision.

Medlin v Nominal Defendant [2021] QSC 186, Brown J, 5 August 2021

source https://cartercapner.com.au/blog/court-says-unidentified-vehicle-did-not-exist-rejects-drivers-1-5-mil-claim/